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BALANCING EFFECTS ACROSS MARKETS
DANIEL A. CRANE*
In Philadelphia National Bank (PNB),1 the Supreme Court held that it is
improper to weigh a merger's procompetitive effects in one market against the
merger's anticompetitive effects in another. The merger in question, which
ostensibly reduced retail competition in the Philadelphia area, could not be
justified on the grounds that it increased competition against New York banks
and hence perhaps enhanced competition in business banking in the mid-At-
lantic region. I will refer to the Supreme Court's prohibition on balancing
effects across markets as a "market-specificity" rule. Under this rule, efficien-
cies that may counterbalance anticompetitive aspects must be specific to the
market in which the anticompetitive aspects are present.
Although the market-specificity rule is periodically invoked and followed,
its justification is hazy. The Court in PNB provided one justification-con-
cern about a slippery slope to monopoly-that has limited applicability. Other
commentators, particularly the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise, have provided
more elaborate but equivocal defenses of the rule.2 For their part, the antitrust
agencies embrace the rule as a baseline, but then leave open the possibility of
waiving it in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion.
In this essay, I revisit the justifications for the market-specificity rule.
While there is some sense to the idea that merger effects should be analyzed
on a market-by-market basis-particularly given the complexity and adminis-
trative difficulty of comparing effects across markets-the principle is not,
and cannot, sensibly be applied as a strict rule. Rather, the principle is best
operationalized as a presumption against balancing effects across market lines
that can be rebutted based on compelling evidence in particular cases.
* Associate Dean, Faculty and Research, and Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law,
University of Michigan.
I United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
2 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 972, at 45-49 (3d ed. 2009).
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I. THE MARKET-SPECIFICITY RULE AND ITS APPLICATIONS
A. THE STAKES IN PNB
Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank (Girard)
were the second and third largest of the 42 commercial banks operating in the
Philadelphia market.3 PNB, a federal chartered bank, had assets of over a bil-
lion dollars while Girard, a Pennsylvania chartered bank, had assets of over
$750 million, 4 so the merged banks' combined assets would be somewhat
under two billion dollars.
The Comptroller of the Currency supported the merger in part based on the
assertion that there would still be plenty of retail banking competition in Phil-
adelphia and in part based on the "beneficial effects of this consolidation upon
international and national competition. '5 Defendants pressed this theme at
trial, arguing that the merger would raise their capitalization and hence their
lending ability for large business loans. They showed that Philadelphia's larg-
est banks were small relative to the size of the market. The two largest banks,
PNB and First Pennsylvania, had lending limits of $8 million, and Girard had
a lending limit of $6 million.6 This, in turn, forced some large businesses
headquartered in Philadelphia to turn to New York banks for lending. The
defendants argued that the merger would allow the bank to increase its lend-
ing limits, thus making the merged bank more competitive with banks outside
the Philadelphia market, particularly New York banks. 7
The Supreme Court held that this effort to offset any anticompetitive harms
in Philadelphia retail banking with procompetitive effects in large business
banking in the mid-Atlantic and Northeast was flatly prohibited. The Court
rejected such balancing due to slippery-slope concerns: "If anticompetitive
effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences in
another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry could,
without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the
end as large as the industry leader."8 In the same paragraph, but turning to a
conceptually different point, the Court rejected the merging parties' assertion
that the combination would benefit Philadelphia businesses seeking large bus-
iness loans, finding that the $8 million lending limits of the two largest banks
were adequate for most businesses and that "[t]he only businesses located in
3 374 U.S. at 330.
4Id. at 331.
I Id. at 333.
6 Id. at 334 n.10.
7 Id. at 334.
8 374 U.S. at 371.
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the Philadelphia area which find such limits inadequate are large enough read-
ily to obtain bank credit in other cities."9
B. THE PNB MARKET-SPECIFICITY RULE IN THE COURTS
Courts in a handful of cases have invoked the PNB market-specificity rule
to reject calls for consideration of procompetitive effects outside the relevant
market. 10 A straightforward application of the rule appears in United States v.
Ivaco, Inc.11 The Justice Department brought an action to enjoin a joint ven-
ture between manufacturers of automatic tampers used to maintain railroad
tracks. The defendants argued that the joint venture would have the procom-
petitive effect of allowing them to become exporters to the European market,
which was then monopolized by an Austrian company. 12 Not surprisingly
given geopolitics, the district court found that PNB foreclosed balancing
procompetitive effects in Europe against anticompetitive effects in the United
States.
Some courts have taken the PNB rule to mean that even intra-market bal-
ancing is prohibited when anticompetitive effects are concentrated in discrete
segments of the market. In RSR Corp. v. FTC,13 the Ninth Circuit relied on
PNB in rejecting the merging parties' argument that an increase in the overall
competitiveness of a national secondary lead market could offset any anticom-
petitive effects from the merger in a particular region.
The relationship between the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects in
the market as a whole is not clear from the opinion. Even though shipping
costs meant that most deliveries occurred within a few hundred miles of
plants, the court found that the relevant market was the entire United States.
14
On a regional basis, the merging parties only had overlapping plants in the
Midwest. 15 Their argument seems to have been that, assuming that the rele-
9 Id. The Court cited nothing in support of this last assertion, and it appears to be contradicted
by the record. The district court found that a "surprising" number of Philadelphia businesses
banked in New York or other large cities, 201 F. Supp. 348, 364 (D.C. Pa. 1962), suggesting that
the Philadelphia banks were constrained in their ability to serve large business customers. As to
the assertion that large businesses could "readily" obtain credit in other cities, the question is not
merely whether credit was available, but at what price. Geographically remote banks may have
charged a higher interest rate to Philadelphia businesses than the merged bank would have.
10 See, e.g., Miss. River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 1972) (citing PNB
market- specificity rule in upholding FTC challenge to cement company acquisition); FTC v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (invoking rule to reject argument that
procompetitive effects in one area from construction of new linerboard mill could offset anticom-
petitive effects in other areas).
11 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
12 Id. at 1427.
13 602 F.2d 1317, 1326 (9th Cir. 1979).
14 Id. at 1322-24.
15 Id. at 1323.
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vant geographic market was the entire United States, any anticompetitive ef-
fects in the Midwest region were offset by gains to competition in the market
as a whole. The court seems to have had its cake and eaten it too by holding
that the market was nationwide but that anticompetitive effects would need to
be assessed on a regional basis.
Other courts, however, have stuck to the line suggested by the relevant
passage in PNB-balancing within a market is permitted, but balancing across
market lines is not. In the class-action follow-on litigation to the FTC's chal-
lenge to Whole Foods's acquisition of Wild Oats, 16 the PNB market-specific-
ity issue arose in the context of class certification. Relying on an economist's
expert report, Whole Foods argued that individual issues predominated as to
whether particular consumers were injured by the anticompetitive effects of
the merger-since the merger had varied effects, both positive and negative,
on the prices of the different goods in the shopping baskets of premium and
organic grocery purchasers/customers. 17 Plaintiffs countered that Whole
Foods's argument violated the PNB market-specificity rule, since accepting it
would mean balancing price decreases for some goods against price increases
for other goods. The district court accepted Whole Foods's argument and de-
nied class certification, observing that "[t]he issue here ... is not whether to
offset harms in one market with benefits in another, but whether to count
benefits against harms in the same market-indeed in the same shopping
basket."18
The market-specificity rule has been explicitly invoked in relatively few
judicial decisions. There are several possible explanations for this. It may be
that few cases present clear instances of efficiencies in one market and an-
ticompetitive effects in another. It also may be that the PNB rule is suffi-
ciently clear that merging parties do not find it worth their while to advance
balancing arguments that would likely fail. Or, it may be an artifact of the
reality that, subsequent to the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, relatively
few merger cases have been litigated to the point of judicial decision.19 If that
is the case, the rule may still be doing important work behind the scenes in
negotiations between the agencies and merging parties.
16 Kottaras v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 16 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Larry V. Muko,
Inc. v. Sw. Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 439 (3d Cir. 1982) (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting) (accusing majority of violating PNB market- specificity rule by balancing procompeti-
tive effects in one market against anticompetitive effects in another).
17Kottaras, 281 F.R.D. at 24-25.
18 Id. at 25.
19 See DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
93-94 (2011).
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C. MARKET-SPECIFICITY AND THE MERGER GUIDELINES
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines continue the practice of previous
guidelines of articulating the market-specificity rule as a general matter but
then asserting that the agencies may waive the rule in their prosecutorial
discretion:
The Agencies normally assess competition in each relevant market affected
by a merger independently and normally will challenge the merger if it is
likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market. In some cases, however,
the Agencies in their prosecutorial discretion will consider efficiencies not
strictly in the relevant market, but so inextricably linked with it that a partial
divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the anticompetitive
effect in the relevant market without sacrificing the efficiencies in the other
market(s). Inextricably linked efficiencies are most likely to make a differ-
ence when they are great and the likely anticompetitive effect in the relevant
market(s) is small so the merger is likely to benefit customers overall.20
How frequently the agencies invoke this prosecutorial discretion in practice
is difficult to say. The exercise of discretion to waive the market-specificity
rule will likely only show up in a case in which the agencies are not challeng-
ing the merger and, hence, there will usually be no formal articulation of the
agencies' view regarding the relevant markets. Further, to the extent that de-
lineation of relevant markets has taken a back seat in the 2010 Merger Guide-
lines (or in the agencies' de facto practices for some time),21 that is a
decreasingly important topic for discussions between the merging parties and
the agencies. The market-specificity rule implies bright lines of demarcation
around distinct relevant markets in which to consider the balance of pro- and
anticompetitive effects, but those lines are increasingly blurred in modern
merger practice.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE MARKET-SPECIFICITY RULE
The PNB decision spends all of a paragraph articulating the market-speci-
ficity rule. The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise, moreover, admits that "[a]t first
blush it could be argued that a merger should be assessed in terms of its net
welfare effects in all markets affected and should be absolved where substan-
tial economies in one market out-weigh adverse competitive effects in
others.1' 22 However, the authors generally support the market-specificity rule
for "statutory, administrative, and practical reasons" except in "rare excep-
20 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 10, at 30 n. 14
(2010) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines], available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-
2010.html.
21 See generally Howard Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the
Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1673 (2013) (explaining agencies' "retreat from formulaic
reliance on market definition").
22 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 972a, at 49.
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tional case[s]," generally when anticompetitive effects in one market are triv-
ial in proportion to the procompetitive gains in another 3.2 The treatise thus
articulates a general presumption in favor of the market-specificity rule, but
instantly proposes a loophole. This suggests that the justifications for the rule
are less than watertight.
A. SLIPPERY SLOPE TO MONOPOLY
As noted earlier, PNB's rejection of balancing effects across markets rested
on the assertion that such balancing inevitably would lead to mergers creating
undue market concentration, since small firms could always justify their
mergers as merely ramping up to par with the industry leader. The Court's
concern was overstated. The balancing proposed by PNB and Girard would
apply only in a case where the merger had simultaneous effects in two mar-
kets, procompetitive in one and anticompetitive in the other. In practice, such
cases will be relatively rare. Further, one could not justify the merger simply
by showing that it produced procompetitive effects in another market. One
would have to show that the procompetitive effects in the other market out-
weighed the anticompetitive effects in the market raising concerns. Recall that
the Court in PNB asserted that, in any event, the merger would not materially
improve the credit options for large Philadelphia businesses, since they could
always borrow from banks in New York or elsewhere.t In that event, the
merger should have been blocked even if balancing across markets were al-
lowed in principle-which undermines the Court's assertion that the slippery
slope would be inevitable. Even if the Court were wrong and Philadelphia
businesses would see some reduction in their cost of capital by virtue of hav-
ing available a Philadelphia bank with enhanced lending limits, that efficiency
might be considerably smaller than the anticompetitive effects from a loss of
competition between PNB and Girard in the Philadelphia market, manifested
in higher borrowing costs to individuals and smaller businesses.
The Court's real concern may have been a little different than the one it
expressed-that balancing efficiencies against anticompetitive aspects from
loss of rivalry as a general matter (and not merely across markets) would
inevitably lead to the justification of a rising tide of concentration in the bank-
ing industry and elsewhere. PNB was decided only a year after Brown Shoe,
in which the Court held that vertical integration between a shoe manufactur-
ing company and a shoe retailer counted against a vertical merger since "by
eliminating wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the
manufacturing division of the enterprise, [the merging parties] can market
23 Id. at 49, 50-53.
24 Supra text accompanying note 9.
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their own brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers." 25
Although the Court retreated from hostility to efficiencies in 1967, holding
that they counted neither for nor against mergers,26 PNB reflects a more gener-
alized antipathy to efficiencies arguments than the attitude prevailing today.27
Even so, the market-specificity rule goes beyond prohibiting balancing effi-
ciencies in one market against anticompetitive effects in another. It prohibits
all balancing across markets, including enhancements in market competitive-
ness. Although antitrust lawyers tend to lump all customer-benefiting merger
effects into the "procompetitive" category, they can be separated analytically
into two distinct subcategories-(1) efficiencies that benefit customers by
lowering the costs of production or distribution or enhancing the quality, func-
tionality, or interoperability of a product; and (2) enhancements in the com-
petitiveness of markets because of the entry or expansion of firms that force
rivals to lower their costs or increase their quality or output.28 The kind of
procompetitive effect claimed in PNB was of the latter variety. PNB and
Girard did not merely claim that Philadelphia businesses would benefit be-
cause the combined bank would have increased lending limits. They claimed
that the market for large business banking throughout the Mid-Atlantic and
Northeastern regions would become more competitive because the merged
firm would become a serious rival to New York banks-not just for custom-
ers in Philadelphia but for customers in the entire region. Whatever the objec-
tions to allowing efficiencies to offset anticompetitive effects in merger
analysis, it is harder to see the objection to allowing enhancements in rivalry
to count in favor of a merger that is being opposed on the theory that it will
diminish rivalry.
B. STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise defends the market-specificity rule on the
ground that Section 7 of the Clayton Act declares unlawful acquisitions that
21 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
26 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("Possible economies cannot be
used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition
may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.").
27 See generally Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347
(2011).
28 It was in the latter sense that Justice Brandeis referred to "promot[ing] competition" in his
classic enunciation of the rule of reason. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) ("The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition."). Brandeis observed that the call rule at issue in Board of Trade "increased the
number of country dealers engaging in this branch of the business," id. at 240, meaning that it
made the market more competitive by bringing more participants into the market. Whether or not
the call rule actually achieved this result is somewhat doubtful. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 44-46 (1978).
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have anticompetitive effects "in any line of commerce in any section of the
country. ' 29 In the authors' view, "the statute thus plainly contemplates that
mergers may involve more than one market, yet it turns legality on a separate
market-by-market approach."30 The treatise finds this parsing of the statutory
text further supported by the Celler-Kefauver Act's legislative history.31
If the treatise's statutory interpretation argument is correct, then it fore-
closes any balancing across market lines, including in the rare cases where the
authors would like to see it happen.3 2 It also forecloses any balancing within a
relevant market that includes submarkets, since submarkets are considered a
"line of commerce" for Section 7 purposes.33 This would mean that a merger
would be prohibited if it produced welfare gains to 99 percent of the buyers in
a relevant market but also enabled the merged firm to raise prices to 1 percent
of buyers in the market with particularly inelastic demand (at least if those
buyers constitute a submarket).
For better or worse, however, disciplined textual exegesis has rarely charac-
terized Section 7 jurisprudence. For example, under Supreme Court precedent,
it is permissible to alternate between demand side and supply side evidence in
defining a relevant market and considering the anticompetitive effects of de-
fendant's conduct,34 as the Court did in Grinnell5 and Continental Can.
3 6 If
the Court in Continental Can could consider evidence "cut[ting] across indus-
try lines" in order to make "an adequate determination of the merger's true
impact"3 7 for the purpose of determining anticompetitive effects, then surely
the same could be done for purposes of determining procompetitive effects.
In any event, as stressed in the Merger Guidelines,38 whether or not the
merging parties could prevail in court based on a balancing of effects across
29 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 972a, at 46 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. 972c, at 52 (suggesting that mergers should be allowed in cases "where the threatened
market is significantly smaller than the benefitted market [and] a tiny efficiency gain in the latter
would . . .dwarf a significant loss in the former").
33 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
34 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JoHN L. SOLOVw, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEm APPLICATION 561, at 360 (3d ed. 2007); see
also In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing use of
supply side factors in defining relevant market).
35 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563. 575-76 (1966) (finding that relevant geo-
graphic market was national because, even though fire and burglary services were sold on a local
basis, the services were planned and fees were set on a national basis).
36 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 456-57 (1964) ("Where the area of
effective competition cuts across industry lines, so must the relevant line of commerce; otherwise
an adequate determination of the merger's true impact cannot be made.").
37Id.
38 Merger Guidelines, supra note 20.
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market lines, the agencies have prosecutorial discretion to engage in such bal-
ancing when deciding whether to bring a case. Since relatively few merger
cases ever make it to litigation, the important practical question is whether the
agencies can be persuaded to think outside the lines of defined markets in
analyzing the likely effects of any given merger. Their guidelines suggest that
they can, although they may be reluctant to do so as a general matter.
C. REFUSAL TO TRADE OFF WELFARE AMONG CLASSES OF CONSUMERS
Areeda and Hovenkamp further justify the market-specificity rule on the
ground that antitrust law should be reluctant to trade off the welfare of some
consumers against those of others: "[T]o balance gains in one market against
potential losses in another would necessarily favor one group of consumers
over another, a decision not ordinarily involved in the single-market case."39
As a general matter, it is true that antitrust law avoids balancing the inter-
ests of different classes of consumers,40 although even procompetitive mergers
often create differential effects (some positive and some negative) for differ-
ent classes of consumers. For example, consider a merger between two cloth-
ing companies that induces the merged firm to shift its brands to a more
upscale position, thus increasing the competitiveness of the upscale segment
of the market but correspondingly decreasing the competitiveness of the
downscale segment. Deciding whether the merger is procompetitive overall
does not depend on evaluating the effects on particular customers in different
portions of the market, even though customers will be differentially affected.
Rather, the required analysis focuses on net price effects within the overall
market.
But even if it would be unsavory to balance the interests of competing
groups of consumers explicitly, it is far from inevitable that deviating from
the market-specificity rule would require such balancing. This objection as-
sumes that we have different customers in the different markets affected by
the merger-a condition that was likely true in PNB itself, where large busi-
ness customers stood to benefit, but small businesses and individuals stood to
lose. In many cases, however, the merger's effects overlap complementary
markets in which the customers largely overlap. In such cases, the customers
themselves would likely prefer to have the merger's effects evaluated in their
totality and not to see the analysis spliced market-by-market.
39 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 972a, at 49.
40 See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1159, 1213-14 (2008)
(explaining why antitrust law does not generally require balancing the interests of some consum-
ers against the interests of other consumers).
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Consider, for example, the FTC's recent enforcement decision in Nielsen/
Arbitron. 41 Nielsen's core business is providing syndicated television audience
measurement data (the "Nielsen ratings"). Arbitron's core business is provid-
ing syndicated radio audience measurement data ("Arbitron certified number
one!"). The Commission pointed to no evidence that, absent the merger, Niel-
sen was likely to enter the radio ratings business or that Arbitron was likely to
enter the television ratings business. The Commission, however, obtained a
consent decree with respect to a potentially emerging market called "cross-
platform measurement," defined as services that "report the overall undupli-
cated audience size (i.e., reach) and frequency of exposure for programming
content and advertisements across multiple media platforms, with correspond-
ing individual audience demographic data." 42 Cross-platform measurement
thus relates audience consumption of content on one platform, such as televi-
sion, radio, or online, to audience consumption of the same content on another
platform (i.e., television, radio, or online).
Almost any customer interested in cross-platform measurement would also
be a customer for audience measurement in at least two of the platforms that
cross-platform measurement connects. Thus, for example, a customer inter-
ested in measurements evaluating the relationship between simultaneous ad-
vertising campaigns in television and radio measurement would also be a
customer for the basic television and radio audience measurement services.
Thus, if the merger hypothetically improved the quality of television and radio
audience measurement but reduced somewhat competition for measuring
across the television and radio spaces, any customers adversely affected in the
cross-platform space would also be positively affected in the basic television
and radio ratings segments. In determining whether they support or oppose the
merger, such customers would naturally consider the net effect on their busi-
ness-i.e., balance effects across markets.
Several important media customers publicly supported the merger. For ex-
ample, David Poltrack, the top market researcher for CBS, who has been
called the "E.F. Hutton in media research," publicly endorsed the deal in a
Media Post interview. 43 CBS owns many properties in both radio and televi-
sion and subscribes to ratings services for both those markets. According to
the Media Post article, CBS would thus have a natural interest in the develop-
41 Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Nielsen Hold-
ings N.V., FTC File No. 131-0058 (Sept. 20, 2013), available at www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
1310058/index.shtm, Nielsen Holdings N.V., FTC File No. 131-0058 (Sept. 20, 2013). The au-
thor represented Nielsen with respect to this transaction. All views expressed about the merger
are solely my own and are based on facts available in the public record.
42 Id. at 2.
43 David Goetzel, CBS' Poltrack Backs Nielsen -Arbitron Deal, Media Post Blogs (June 11,
2013), www.mediapost.com/publications/article/ 202223/#axzz2holo5T9G.
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ment of cross-platform measurement as well. Even though some industry par-
ticipants had concerns over the effects of the merger on cross-platform
measurement, Poltrack strongly endorsed the deal, focusing on its procompe-
titive benefits for radio measurement in particular.
Suppose Poltrack's response was representative and that most customers in
the industry would see net benefits to their business from the merger, even if
it reduced competition for cross-platform measurement. Would it still be sen-
sible to prohibit balancing of effects across market lines if that was the way
customers that purchase the relevant services would make their own evalua-
tions? To take an even stronger example, consider a defense industry merger
with essentially one customer-the federal government. If the Defense De-
partment concluded that, on net, the merger would be beneficial to its interests
even if it diminished competition in some markets, it would support the
merger. 44 This is not to say that the customer support for a merger necessarily
requires approving the deal,45 but the fact that a customer considers a deal's
net effects should be suggestive in considering how best to protect the inter-
ests of customers.
This observation would only serve as a qualification to the market-specific-
ity rule in cases where the effects of a merger are distributed across common
customers in the different affected markets. It would not challenge the Su-
preme Court's use of the market-specificity rule in PNB itself.
D. MAXIMIZING WELFARE EFFECTS
The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise argues that balancing across markets is
usually not required because society can obtain the maximum benefits result-
ing from procompetitive mergers by requiring divestures or conduct remedies
in any market raising anticompetitive concerns-even while allowing the
merger to proceed and thus capturing the gains in markets requiring no fix.4 6
Thus, suppose the merger would produce a procompetitive effect in Market A
worth $5 and an anticompetitive effect in Market B worth -$2, with a net gain
to society of $3. Under a balancing approach, the merger should be approved.
However, if courts and agencies refused balancing and instead required a fix
(either through divestiture or conduct remedy) that brought Market B to a net
competitive effect of zero, the net gain to society from the merger would be
44 See Tom Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly in Mergers, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 531 (2007)
(discussing Defense Department support for LTV's attempted acquisition of Grumman and
FTC's opposition).
41 See id.
46 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 50.
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$5 rather than $3. Thus, refusing to balance may increase the net gains to
society from the merger.47
Before turning to the merits of this argument in cases where it might apply,
observe that in some cases it simply will not be applicable. Divestiture or
conduct remedies are not available to fix competition problems in every
merger case. As the Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise recognizes, it is unlikely
a fix was available in PNB itself.48
Even as to cases where such remedies are available, the argument suggests
a conception of antitrust law that is not obvious. It implies that merging par-
ties have a duty not merely to avoid reducing net consumer welfare but to
optimize it-at least in those cases in which the agencies can identify some
reduction in competition in some sector. Even a merger that would advance
net consumer welfare could be challenged on the ground that it could advance
consumer welfare more.
The question of whether antitrust law requires welfare optimization or sim-
ply prohibits welfare reduction is not limited to the context of balancing
merger efficiencies across markets. It is analogous to the question of whether
rule of reason analysis requires parties justifying a restraint of trade to show
that the restraints were the least restrictive alternative available to advance the
relevant procompetitive interest. Analytically, such a question would not arise
unless it were assumed that the restraint in question generated more social
benefit than harm. Otherwise, the restraint should be condemned even if it
were the least restrictive means of achieving the relevant efficiency. So in
both the merger and rule of reason context, the question is whether a restric-
tion on competition that produces a net benefit to society must minimize any
collateral damage to competition or is simply permissible on the theory that
antitrust law only prohibits acts that reduce net social welfare.
In the rule of reason context, this question is unsettled. Lower courts often
say that the rule of reason requires consideration of less restrictive alternatives
in deciding whether a restraint on competition is justified by procompetitive
justifications. 49 But dissenting from the denial of certiorari in a case pitting the
National Football League against the North American Soccer League, Justice
Rehnquist complained that the Second Circuit had improperly read a least
47 The net social gain may be less than the $5 postulated since it may be expensive for the
merging parties to fix the competition problem in Market B. The treatise would disregard such
private costs, id., presumably on the theory that they do not have a negative effect on consumer
welfare.
48 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 50.
49 See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 825 (6th Cir. 2011); Ark. Carpenters
Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2010); Gregory v. Ft. Bridger
Rendezvous Ass'n, 448 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2006).
[Vol. 80
BALANCING EFFECTS ACROSS MARKETS
restrictive alternative analysis-akin to that employed in strict scrutiny con-
texts in constitutional law-into the rule of reason. 50 Rehnquist argued that
"[t]he antitrust laws impose a standard of reasonableness, not a standard of
absolute necessity. '51 For their part, the FTC and the Antitrust Division do not
demand a showing that the restraint was essential to achieving the efficiencies
but merely that the efficiency could not have been achieved by "practical,
significantly less restrictive means. '52 By the same token, in the merger effi-
ciencies context, the agencies consider whether alternative solutions could
have achieved the efficiencies in a manner less harmful to competition, but
then specify that only reasonable and practical alternatives should be consid-
ered. 53 Hence, in both their competitor collaboration and merger guidelines,
the agencies consider less restrictive alternatives but do not require strict op-
timization of social welfare.
However closely one might insist that the means fit the ends in the antitrust
context, it is hard to see why the market-specificity rule should flatly prohibit
inter-market balancing rather than simply require that any reductions in com-
petition be reasonably necessary to achieve relevant efficiencies. In other
words, one could say that a merger that produces a large benefit to consumer
welfare in Market A and a small diminution in consumer welfare in Market B
should not be allowed to proceed unconditionally if a fix (divestiture or con-
duct commitment) in Market B would alleviate the anticompetitive concern.
The underlying rationale would be that the anticompetitive effects in Market
B are not reasonably necessary to achieving the procompetitive effects in
Market A. Such an approach, however, would not prohibit balancing effects
across markets in the event that anticompetitive effects in Market B could not
be reasonably fixed without jeopardizing the economics of the merger.
E. ADMINISTRABILITY
The most convincing justification for a market-specificity rule is that bal-
ancing pro- and anticompetitive effects across market boundaries unduly in-
" Nat'l Football League v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1079 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
51 Id.
52 Fed. Trade Comm'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collabora-
tions Among Competitors § 3.36(b) (2000), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguide
lines.pdf.
53 Merger Guidelines, supra note 20, § 10 ("The Agencies credit only those efficiencies likely
to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of
either the proposed merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects. These
are termed merger-specific efficiencies. Only alternatives that are practical in the business situa-
tion faced by the merging firms are considered in making this determination. The Agencies do
not insist upon a less restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical.").
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creases the complexity of antitrust decision making. 4 The increases in
complexity may do more than simply impose costs on agencies, courts, and
parties. They may also bias decision making in favor of anticompetitive merg-
ers. The concern would be that if decision makers are required to balance all
relevant effects before disapproving a merger and cannot confidently say that
the effects are (on balance) negative, the tendency may be to approve a supra-
optimal set of mergers.
In evaluating this objection, it is important to distinguish between two kinds
of balancing prohibited by PNB. First, there is the kind under discussion
here-balancing procompetitive effects in one market against anticompetitive
effects in another. But there is also a second kind of possible balancing-
examining the broad socio-economic effects of a merger and weighing them
against the direct effects on prices or output. In PNB, the banks argued that
their merger would stimulate economic development in Philadelphia with
broad socio-economic benefits redounding to the entire geographic region.55
The Court rejected this argument, holding that "a merger the effect of which
,may be substantially to lessen competition' is not saved because, on some
ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed
beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of
judicial competence .... 56
The administrative concerns for the second kind of balancing are far more
pronounced than for the first. Price increases resulting from a merger and
spillover socio-economic effects are incommensurable given the price-theo-
retic techniques of antitrust analysis. The same is not necessarily true of price
effects in two related markets. Indeed, "all" that is needed to compare price
effects in two markets is information about total revenues, demand elasticities,
and predicted effects of the merger on prices. I put "all" into quotation marks
because elasticities are often hard to calculate and merger effects hard to pre-
dict. But if it can be done in a particular case as to the two markets in ques-
tion, the comparisons are not difficult to make. The question is just whether
the procompetitive price effect exceeds the anticompetitive price effect.
Further, some of the concerns over uncertainty, administrative costs, and
systemic bias in favor of allowing mergers can be addressed by placing on the
merging parties the burden of proving that the balancing favors allowing the
merger. The administrative obstacle to balancing effects across markets would
14 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 50 ("[A]dministrative and practical considera-
tions point strongly against taking a balancing approach. In all but clear cases, it would be diffi-
cult enough to determine a merger's probable net welfare consequences in a single market; one
must rely on general probabilities. The difficulties of balancing effects in different markets are
even more severe.").
55 374 U.S. at 371.
5 6Id.
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be greatest if the government were required to prove as part of its prima facie
case that the merger yielded a net diminution in consumer welfare across mar-
kets. But it would be less cumbersome if the PNB rule were preserved as to
the government's prima facie case-the government merely has to show that
the merger produces anticompetitive effects in at least one market-but the
defendants were allowed a rebuttal opportunity to show that the merger in-
creases welfare across markets.
III. CONCLUSION
PNB's market-specificity rule makes sense as a means of preventing merger
analysis from descending into uncontrollable and unresolvable complexity.
On the other hand, as both the Merger Guidelines and the Areeda-Hovenkamp
treatise suggest, there will be times when mechanical application of the rule
would require prohibition of mergers that would significantly increase con-
sumer welfare. The market-specificity rule is best operationalized as a rebutta-
ble presumption-which appears to be largely the way the antitrust agencies
have treated it.
